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Personality Is the Main Issue 
Presidential Election-Outcome Forecasting 
 
Aubrey Immelman 
St. John’s University, Minn. 
 
As I write this in mid-November, the 
outcome of the 2000 presidential 
election still hangs in the balance as the 
nation awaits final results from the state 
of Florida. In stark contrast to the 
uncertainty surrounding the result of this 
closely contested race, various 
prognosticators and self-proclaimed 
pundits—myself included—confidently 
predicted a clear outcome to the contest. 
 
At a March 6, 1999 meeting of the 
Psychohistory Forum (reported in Why 
Al Gore will not be elected president in 
2000, Clio’s Psyche, Sept. 1999, pp. 73–
75), 20 months before the election, I 
predicted Al Gore would fail in his bid 
for the presidency, “provided the 
Republicans field an outgoing, relatively 
extraverted, charismatic candidate.” 
Specifically, I contended that Vice 
President Gore’s conscientious, 
introverted personality pattern augured 
poorly for his candidacy “in an era 
where political campaigns are governed 
by saturation television coverage and the 
boundaries between leadership and 
celebrity have become increasingly 
blurred.” 
 
In the other corner, seven academics at 
the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association in August 
forecast a decisive win for Gore. Using 
predictor variables such as economic 
growth, the public’s perception of 
economic well-being, the popularity of 
the incumbent president, and the 
candidates’ standing in public opinion 
polls, six analysts forecast comfortable 
victory margins ranging from 52.3 to 
55.4 percent of the major-party vote for 
Gore, while a seventh predicted a Gore 
landslide at 60.3 percent. 
 
In retrospect, it appears that Bush’s 
dispositional advantage, as predicted, 
effectively cancelled out Gore’s 
considerable situational advantage. It 
follows that presidential forecasting 
models can be refined by acknowledging 
the pivotal role of personality in 
contemporary presidential campaigns, 
and entering it into the political-
economic equation. 
 
My interest in political personality 
assessment is not, however, limited to its 
potential as a part-predictor of election 
outcomes. Of much greater import, 
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personality foreshadows a candidate’s 
presidential performance and proficiency 
as a campaigner. Briefly — and focusing 
only on their shortcomings, for 
illustrative purposes — here is how my 
personality-based predictions fared in 
anticipating the two major-party 
candidates’ behavior during the 2000 
presidential campaign. 
 
In my March 1999 profile of Gore, I 
predicted that his “major personality-
based limitations” would be “deficits in 
the important political skills of 
interpersonality, charisma, and 
spontaneity,” and that “moralistically 
conscientious features in his profile” 
incurred the risk of “alienating some 
constituencies.” That much was evident 
in the first presidential debate, which 
Gore won on raw debating points but 
lost in the court of public opinion. His 
debate performance, keenly parodied on 
NBC’s “Saturday Night Live,” was 
widely perceived as supercilious and 
overbearing. 
 
A critical determinant of whether people 
form positive or negative personal 
impressions hinges on their perception 
of others as warm and outgoing or as 
cold and retiring, and presidential 
politics on television plays a leading role 
in shaping those perceptions. Since the 
first televised presidential debates in 
1960, with the exception of Richard 
Nixon, the more outgoing presidential 
candidate with the greatest personal 
charisma and publicly perceived warmth 
or likeability has won every election. 
Rightly or wrongly, voters tend to 
perceive the social reserve and 
emotional distance of introverted 
candidates as indifference and a lack of 
empathy, which elicits a reciprocal 
response to the candidate. The prototype 
of the presidential candidate who fails to 
ignite the public’s passion in an era of 
“made-for-television” elections is the 
conscientious introvert — a character 
type that has not occupied the Oval 
Office since Jimmy Carter and, before 
him, Herbert Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, 
and Woodrow Wilson. 
 
In my September 1999 Clio’s Psyche 
profile of George W. Bush (The political 
personality of George W. Bush, pp. 75–
76), I predicted that the Texas 
governor’s “personality-based limit-
ations include a propensity for 
superficial command of complex issues, 
a tendency to be easily bored by routine, 
a predisposition to act impulsively, and a 
predilection to favor personal 
connections, friendship, and loyalty over 
competence in staffing decisions and 
political appointments.” 
 
This inference, too, was largely borne 
out in the course of the campaign. 
Indeed, the Gore campaign’s most 
effective weapon against Bush in the 
run-up to the election was the charge 
that he lacked the capacity to be 
president — usually framed in terms of a 
lack of experience, stature, or readiness 
to lead the nation. And at least one 
commentator attributed Bush’s 
occasional lapses on the stump to 
boredom with routine. As for 
impulsiveness, suffice it to say, “major 
league” (with apologies to New York 
Times reporter Adam Clymer). 
 
Most telling, however, was the way 
Bush predictably stumbled into the 
pitfall of favoring personal connections 
and loyalty in his staffing decisions — a 
common theme among extraverted 
candidates. Surely Bush’s selection of 
Dick Cheney as his running mate — the 
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very person charged by George W. to 
lead his vice-presidential search (and 
secretary of defense in his father’s 
administration) — must count foremost 
in terms of Bush’s personality-based 
predisposition to favor friendship and 
loyalty in his political appointments. The 
selection of Cheney may well turn out to 
have been a contributing factor should 
Bush lose an election as closely 
contested as this one, whereas 
Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge may 
well have delivered his key battleground 
state to Bush. 
 
Gore, in contrast, made a more 
calculated selection in his choice of Joe 
Lieberman as his running mate. As I 
wrote in an op-ed article last fall, “What 
Gore really needs is a running mate who 
can balance his personal deficits in the 
politically pivotal skills of easily 
connecting with people. ... Lieberman’s 
disarmingly warm, engaging manner 
will stand the Democratic ticket in good 
stead” (Vice-presidential nominee helps 
Gore more than Bush, St. Cloud Times, 
Sept. 10, 2000, p. 9B). 
 
In closing, for Gore to have captured a 
slim majority of the popular vote is 
testimony not of his strength as a 
candidate, but of the strength of the 
economy and the collective contentment 
of the American people. Toward the end 
of the campaign, Gore seemed more 
animated and passionate, if not quite 
transcending his reputation for stiffness. 
But his performance in the first 
presidential debate, noted earlier, offers 
scant evidence of real personal growth in 
the course of the campaign — not 
unexpectedly, given the firm roots of his 
pedantic, moralistic manner in a deeply 
conscientious character structure. 
Much the same can be said of Bush. 
Although he clearly honed his debating 
skills, his lack of candor about his 1976 
arrest for driving while intoxicated could 
be indicative of the tendency for 
outgoing personalities to employ 
defensive dissociation: a failure to face 
up to unpleasant reality, accompanied by 
cosmetic image-making revealed in a 
succession of socially attractive but 
changing facades. Predictably, Bush was 
unable to overcome his “lack-of-
gravitas” problem. 
 
No matter who is ultimately declared the 
winner, the new president will face an 
uphill battle. Gore will likely have the 
harder time of it, on situational as well 
as dispositional grounds. Situationally, 
he could face narrow Republican 
majorities in both the House and Senate. 
Dispositionally, his relative introversion 
poses an obstacle to the kind of coalition 
building and forging of supportive 
relationships necessary for effectuating 
his policy initiatives. Although Bush for 
his part will be considerably hampered 
by the slender margins of the 
congressional Republican majorities, his 
less ideological, more conciliatory 
orientation will augment his outgoing, 
“retail” political skills, which could 
catalyze his capacity to consummate his 
policy objectives. 
 
Aubrey Immelman, PhD, is an associate 
professor of psychology at St. John’s 
University in Minnesota, where he 
directs the Unit for the Study of 
Personality in Politics. He can be 
reached at aimmelman@csbsju.edu. 
 
 
 
 
